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This article offers a conceptualization of crime and punishment that serves to
explain current trends in criminal law doctrine and, at points, recommends
their reconsideration. Drawing on Hegel’s concept of mutual recognition and
on insights developed in fair-play accounts of punishment, the article suggests
that crime disrupts the subject-subject relation between the victim and the
offender, and that punishment works to restore this relation. To advance this
argument, the article first proposes that subjects can only exist in equilibrium of
connectedness and separateness whereby they mediate each other’s equal per-
sonal boundaries. It then analyzes crime as a failure by the offender to mediate
the victim’s equal boundaries, which creates inequality of boundaries and
brings about the collapse of the equilibrium and of the victim’s subjectivity.
Next, it is suggested that punishment re-equalizes the parties’ respective bound-
aries, thus restoring the disrupted equilibrium and the victim’s subjectivity. The
article then demonstrates that this conceptualization helps explain current
developments in areas such as mens rea and justificatory defenses, and that
it further provides theoretical foundations for critical evaluation of well-
established doctrines such as self-defense and attempt.
*Liat Levanon is Lecturer in Law at Brunel Law School, Brunel University, London. She
received her doctorate from the University of Cambridge. Her major research interests
center on criminal punishment, criminal law doctrine, and evidence law.
My deepest gratitude to Antony Duff, Andrew Botterell, and Amit Pundik for their
thorough and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I am also greatly indebted to an
anonymous reviewer and to Roger Levesque, the New Criminal Law Review editor, for
invaluable help and for their suggestions for improvement of the article. Last but not least,
I am thankful to the participants of the Criminal Law Discussion Group at Oxford Uni-
versity for their comments and insights.
| 537
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 18, Number 4, pps 537–574. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206. © 2015 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please
direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the
University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/
journals.php?p¼reprints. DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2015.18.4.537.
Keywords: criminal punishment, mutual recognition, personal boundaries,
criminal law doctrine
I N TRODUCT ION
The idea that criminal punishment has restorative aspects is not new;
neither is the idea that these aspects bear implications for criminal law
doctrine. In his seminal Punishment, Communication, and Community,
Antony Duff has provided the most recent and probably most robust
restorative interpretation of punishment.1 For Duff, restoration requires
a punitive response, ‘‘in that the kind of restoration that crime makes
necessary can (given certain deep features of our social lives) be brought
about only through retributive punishment.’’2 Yet Duff suggests that
restorative punishment may well take the form of mediation,3 and that
only rarely, if at all, would it take the form of imprisonment.4 His restor-
ative account of punishment thus does not seek to justify traditional crim-
inal punishment. Indeed, only few accounts of traditional criminal
punishment are restorative through and through. Even fewer accounts
consider the implications of the restorative nature of traditional punish-
ment for criminal law doctrine.5 Restorative accounts of traditional crim-
inal punishment, which bear implications for criminal law doctrine, have
been developed mainly in two fairly different strands of the literature: the
Hegelian strand and the fair-play strand.
For Hegel, punishment restores a constitutive aspect of subjectivity that
has been violated by crime. The clearest exposition of Hegel’s account of
crime and punishment is found in his Philosophy of Right,6 but this expo-
sition should be read together with the intriguing Phenomenology of Spirit.7
1. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001).
2. R.A. Duff, ‘‘Restoration and Retribution,’’ in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS?, 43 (Andrew von Hirsch et. al. eds.,
2003).
3. Id. at 53.
4. Id. at 57–58.
5. An exception can be found in Alan Brudner’s Hegelian account of criminal pun-
ishment in his Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Criminal Justice (2009).
6. G.W.F. HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans.;
Stephen Houlgate rev., ed., intro., 2008) (1952, 1821).
7. HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., J.N. Findlay, analysis,
forward, 1977) (1807).
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When these sources are read together, they suggest that subjects are
constituted through processes of mutual recognition; that crime is an
instance of wrongful misrecognition; that righting the wrong of crime
involves healing processes replacing misrecognition with recognition; and
that these processes are essentially substantiated as state punishment. State
punishment is a practice of confession by the particularistic ‘‘acting con-
sciousness’’ (here: the offender) and of forgiveness by the universalistic
‘‘judging consciousness’’ (here: the modern just state)—a practice that
culminates in their mutual recognition. As recently demonstrated by Alan
Brudner, such an account of crime and punishment can provide the basis
for detailed critical evaluation of criminal law doctrine.8
Hegel’s restorative account of state punishment builds on two contro-
versial assumptions: that the modern state is the ultimate universalistic or
just entity that emerges at the end of a long course of historical develop-
ment,9 and that it is an organic whole that constitutes individual subjects
rather than an aggregation of individual subjects that exist prior to it.
Although these assumptions lay the ground for constructive critique of
social and political institutions, they may devalue persons living under
undeveloped institutions, and they further leave no place for the subject
to exist as such and at the same time to maintain its distance from the state.
Hegelian theories of crime and punishment are thus vulnerable to critique
over the implications of their underlying assumptions.
The second strand of penology that considers punishment as restor-
ative is the ‘‘fair-play’’ strand, and predominantly Herbert Morris’ pio-
neering work in this area.10 Morris’ conceptualization of crime and
punishment is semicontractual. For Morris, punishment restores equality
of liberties and burdens that has been violated by crime. He describes
crime as the unfair acquisition of a share of freedom that other members
of society had forgone.11 The criminal ‘‘renounces a burden which others
8. BRUDNER, supra note 5.
9. For an interesting interpretation, see Sibyl M. Schwarzenbach, Rawls, Hegel, and
Communitarianism, 19(4) POL. THEORY 539 (1991).
10. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968). See also John
Finnis, The Restoration of Retributivism, 32 ANALYSIS 131 (1972); GEORGE SHER, DESERT
69–90 (1987); Richard Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193 (1982). For
a fair-play theory of sentencing, see Michael Davis, Criminal Desert and Unfair Advantage:
What’s the Connection?, 12 LAW & PHIL. 133 (1993).
11. Morris, supra note 10.
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have voluntarily assumed and thus gains an advantage which others, who
have restrained themselves, do not possess.’’12 In response to crime, pun-
ishment encroaches upon the criminal’s freedom, thereby ‘‘taking away’’
from the criminal the extra share of liberty that was unfairly acquired.
Equality of freedoms and burdens is thereby restored. Later literature has
demonstrated sporadic possible implications of Morris’ restorative account
for criminal law doctrine.13
Yet Morris’ account has been criticized as misrepresenting crime and
punishment. According to this criticism, Morris mistakenly presumes that
one is a priori free to commit crime, and that the wrongness of crime lies
not in its impact on the victim but in taking a share of freedom in a way
that is unfair to all other members of society.14 Fair-play accounts are thus
also vulnerable, even if to a different type of critique.
This article follows these two theoretical strands in suggesting that
criminal punishment is a restorative practice, but it proposes a different
and hopefully less vulnerable analysis of punitive restoration—an analysis
that develops and integrates some of the insights offered by each of these
strands. The article draws on some of Hegel’s assumptions about subjec-
tivity and intersubjectivity to construct a semicontractual account of crime
and punishment that focuses on the relationship between the offender and
the victim. It proposes that criminal punishment is restorative of the vic-
tim’s subjectivity as it is determined in her relationship with the offender.
The article further proposes that this analysis can explain various criminal
law doctrines and provide normative basis for their evaluation.
To advance this argument, a preliminary account of (inter)subjectivity is
introduced. Naturalizing and qualifying some of Hegel’s assumptions
about recognition, it is suggested that subjects exist in equilibrium of
connectedness with and separateness from one another. In this equilibrium,
subjects recognize one another’s (incomplete) independence or qualified
separateness. They do so through a mutual exercise of respect for—and
mediation of—each other’s personal boundaries.
12. Id. at 477. Various authors have attempted to develop the idea of unfair advantage
introduced by Morris. See Finnis, SHER, Burgh, and Davis, cited supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete Crimes,
5 LAW & PHIL. 1–32 (1986).
14. R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 211–17 (1986). For other criticisms, see
David Dolinko, Some Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537 (1991).
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The article then draws on some insights offered by fair-play accounts to
clarify the significance of equality for mutual recognition. It is suggested
that equilibrium of qualified separateness can only be maintained as long as
subjects hold equal boundaries with respect to one another. Only equals
can keep each other’s desire out, thus mutually maintaining their (incom-
plete) independence.15 Qualified separateness thus presumes and requires
equality—equality of boundaries and equality of agency.
Crime is then analyzed as a unilateral and asymmetrical transgression of
the victim’s boundaries. This transgression involves the creation of inequal-
ity of boundaries between the offender and the victim, the disruption of the
equilibrium of qualified separateness, and the taking over of the victim by
the offender’s desire.
Next, it is suggested that the response to crime must be restorative—it
must undo crime by re-equalizing the boundaries that the parties hold with
respect to one another, thus restoring the equilibrium of qualified sepa-
rateness. Re-equalization of the parties’ personal boundaries and restoration
of the equilibrium can only be achieved through the imposition of pun-
ishment. Punishment is thus justified as a practice that works to restore the
victim’s subjectivity in her relationship with the offender.
Last, the article discusses the ways in which the proposed conceptual-
ization of crime and punishment can not only enrich our understanding
of well-established criminal law doctrines, but also provide normative
foundations for their critical evaluation. Furthermore, it will be shown
that the proposed account can explain current trends in criminal law,
such as subjectivism, expansion of justificatory defenses, and criminali-
zation of exploitation.
I . CR IME AND PUN ISHMENT : M ISRECOGN IT ION
AND RECOGN IT ION
A. Mutual Recognition, (Inter)subjectivity, and
Qualified Separateness
Hegel suggests that subjectivity is constituted in universalistic processes of
mutual recognition. Mutual recognition takes place upon encounter between
15. And hence also their internal unity. See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELF-
CONSTITUTION: AGENCY, IDENTITY, AND INTEGRITY (2009).
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two wills. The human will is, for Hegel, the universal rational will that
determines itself through contingencies (that is, through the particular char-
acteristics of every individual). Upon an encounter between two wills, each
will’s universality is reflected back to it from the other will.16 Each will thus
looks back to itself—or returns to itself—thereby acknowledging that (1) the
Other cannot be me despite her universality, because her universality is
otherwise determined; (2) the Other cannot be mine despite her contingent
existence, because her contingent existence is a determination of universality,
and universality makes her un-possessable, or free, like me.17 This coordi-
nated acknowledgement of the Other as a subject that possesses universality
and contingency is mutual recognition. It is the establishment of the rational
and universal subject-subject relation.
Through mutual recognition self and Other become separate subjects
delineated by personal boundaries, which are in their exclusive control.18
Rather than uncontrolled expansion that is everything and nothing at the
same time, the will that returns to itself gains, through this very exercise,
real dominion or control over its bounded self.19 The will is now realized
only through specific contingencies in which it manifests itself, for exam-
ple, one’s body, one’s property, or one’s concrete preferences.20 The
mutual return-to-self therefore marks the realm of the fully formed
bounded subject.
Personal boundaries can be fundamental or nonfundamental. Funda-
mental boundaries are basic boundaries that allow the will to express itself
further through other nonfundamental boundaries. Fundamental bound-
aries include, first and foremost, bodily boundaries. The will requires
a bounded body to be able to further express itself, for example, through
16. In Hegel’s terminology, mutual recognition takes place when self-consciousness
encounters another self-consciousness. Upon this encounter, self-consciousness that has
gone out of itself identifies its universality (or rationality) in the other self-consciousness,
and then returns to itself, leaving the other self-consciousness free. HEGEL’S PHENOME-
NOLOGY, supra note 7, at 111–12 (paras. 178–84).
17. See HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 7, at 111–12 (paras. 178–84).
18. Compare with Hegel’s account of recognition in the PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note
7. The proposed account places the spotlight on the role of the self in its own constitution.
19. Compare with Hegel’s account of freedom, a clear analysis of which can be found in
Merold Westphal, Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity (1992) 3-19.
20. Compare with Philip Pettit’s notion of rights, for example, in The Consequentialist
Can Recognise Rights, 38 PHIL. Q. 42 (1988).
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its musical tastes and tendencies. The term ‘‘bodily boundaries’’ is used in
a broad sense here, referring to the will’s exclusive control over the body
and over action, which is a bodily manifestation of concrete wills. Arguably,
fundamental boundaries also include property, since gaining full subjectiv-
ity requires objects in relation to which subjectivity is determined, and
property is, allegedly, a pure object against which subjectivity can be fully
expressed.21 Other boundaries and distinctions, such as the self’s tastes or
preferences, are nonfundamental; they are inessential expressions of the
will. They are not required for the will to be able to express itself through
yet other particularities.22 The subject can thus be initially described as
a self-conscious will that gains its existence through fundamental bound-
aries and further expresses itself through nonfundamental boundaries. This
article is concerned with fundamental boundaries that constitute what can
be termed ‘‘bare subjectivity,’’ and that, as we shall see below, crime
transgresses.
B. Equilibrium and Equality
The mutuality of mutual recognition opens the door to a semicontractual
analysis of the universal subject-subject relation—an analysis that is based
on the notion of equality.
In mutual recognition subjects exist in equilibrium with one another.
Each of the mutually recognizing wills mediates the other’s identification of
universality and return-to-self. Connectedness and separateness are thereby
formed in a continuous exercise of constitution and dissolution of bound-
aries. We can therefore speak of equilibrium in which subjects successfully
move toward, or create and recreate, their qualified separateness that is
delineated by their personal boundaries.
Yet to be successful, the constant movements of the two wills must
reflect and produce equality. In equilibrium of qualified separateness, sub-
jects commonly create and maintain equal fundamental boundaries with
respect to one another. To understand the nature, the significance, and the
essentiality of this equality, the characteristics of boundaries should be
21. Compare with Meir Dan Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 404 (2001).
22. Ends reflect the ordering or structure of tastes, desires, etc.; as such they are con-
nected with the Universal, or with unity that is expressed internally and externally.
CRIM INAL PUNISHMENT AS A RESTORAT IVE PRACT ICE | 543
further observed. It was explained earlier that boundaries are particularities
to which the will withdraws upon encounter with an Other; that this
withdrawal entails the formulation of delineated dominion or exclusive
control over these particularities; and that fundamental boundaries are
those boundaries that are essential for the constitution of subjectivity.
Another element can now be added to this characterization of (fundamen-
tal) boundaries: (fundamental) boundaries are also areas of vulnerable force
or power. They are areas of force or power because they are the domain of
the will, which is a source of movement and life; and they are areas of
vulnerability, because, being mediated by an Other, they are always at risk
of transgression by that Other. Rather than mediating dominion over
fundamental particularities, the Other might negate dominion;23 rather
than recognizing and returning to itself, the Other might misrecgonize
and intrude. And to avoid misrecognition and intrusion, fundamental
boundaries must be kept equal.
As long as personal boundaries are equal, subjects can keep each other’s
particularistic desire out.24 Each of the mutually recognizing wills iden-
tifies itself in the other who is equal to it. It thereby becomes aware of the
other’s force and of its own vulnerability, and acknowledges that only
mutual return-to-self will allow subjectivity to persist. The two wills then
mediate each other’s return-to-self, thus (re)establishing equal fundamen-
tal boundaries and (re)constituting the equilibrium of qualified separate-
ness. We come across one another, we intertwine, our wills meet or clash,
but amidst constant and intensive interaction, our equal fundamental
boundaries maintain our agency.25 Equality of boundaries is thus an
essential aspect of the equilibrium, without which it is doomed to
collapse.
23. The next subsection clarifies this point: since the boundary is shared—the boundary
of one’s body is also the boundary of the Other’s will—its existence requires that the Other’s
will is bounded, or returns to itself.
24. For a discussion of Hegelian desire and its role in self-consciousness, see for example,
Robert Pippin, Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit
(2012).
25. This derivation of a minimal principle of equality avoids the levelling down objection
discussed in Andrew Mason, Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection, 61 ANALYSIS
246 (2001); Thomas Cristiano & Will Braynen, Inequality, Injustice, and Levelling Down, 21
RATIO 392 (2008); Nils Holtug, Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection, 58
ANALYSIS 166 (1998).
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C. Crime
We can now move on to the analysis of crime. This subsection takes rape,
torture, and continuous abuse as instances of extreme criminality that bring
to light that which characterizes all crime, namely, the destruction of the
victim’s subjectivity in her relationship with the offender. It suggests that
crime brings about the destruction of the rational and universal subject-
subject relation between the parties. The tortured victim goes through
internal transformation that leaves him empty of his own self in his rela-
tionship with the torturer—he becomes a mere mouth of his torturer;26 the
raped or abused victim loses sight of the reality of her relationship with her
abuser, and she cannot identify her own abuse within this relationship.27
These alterations reflect a transition from a state of equality between
offender and victim to a state of inequality; they are expressions of the
disruption of the universal equilibrium of qualified separateness.
In the case of crime, rather than recognition, misrecognition takes place:
the offender who encounters the victim fails to identify himself in the
victim; he does not acknowledge the humanity or universality of the vic-
tim, which they both have in common. Therefore, he does not return to
himself and (re)create together with the victim their equal fundamental
boundaries, or the universal subject-subject relation. Rather, he disregards
what was until that moment the victim’s personal boundary (created and
recreated by the offender and the victim through their pre-crime mutual
noninterference), and deploys his force to transgress it.
Transgression has four logically consecutive meanings: rather than
returning to himself, the offender uses his force to push away the victim’s
boundaries; one of the victim’s boundaries is eliminated, removed, or
‘‘opened’’; the parties’ boundaries are no longer equal; and the offender’s
desire (which is now adopted as the principle of his will) intrudes the
victim. This sequence of meanings is the collapse of the equilibrium of
qualified separateness. Due to the inequality of fundamental boundaries
brought about by the offender, the conditions for successful movements
26. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD, ch. 1 (1985), to which Honneth also refers. See also David Sussman, What’s Wrong
with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (2005).
27. Indeed, help for victims of domestic violence includes helping them identify the
violation. See, e.g., Recognising Abuse, http://www.refuge.org.uk/get-help-now/help-for-
women/recognising-abuse/.
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toward qualified separateness are no longer present, and the movements
fail. In this way crime undermines the victim’s subjectivity in her relation-
ship with the offender. The universal subject-subject relation collapses.
The actual expression of this violation of subjectivity is to be found in
the forces that motivate the victim for action in her relationship with the
offender. Although the victim can still identify some distinction between
herself and the offender, and even between her particularistic will and the
offender’s particularistic will, she is unable to keep the offender’s particu-
laristic will out and prevent it from becoming her motivating force.28
Following the intrusion, what motivates the victim’s actions in this rela-
tionship is not her independently formulated reasons but the offender’s
particularistic will that has overtaken her.
This alteration of the victim’s motivations lasts during and after the
intrusion. During the intrusion, the victim is forced to react to the attack
(by submitting or by struggling) rather than maintain independence. She
becomes, as it were, an extension of the offender, or the offender’s tool,
rather than a subject motivated by reasons. But the implications of the
intrusion do not cease to exist once the intrusion has been completed. This
is so because the intrusion is an intrusion by the offender’s will, which has
adopted the offender’s desire as its principle; and whereas desire is contin-
gent and subject to limitations of time and space, the will is infinite. The
offender’s intrusive will, which was realized through his contingent desire,
maintains control over the victim even when the commission of crime has
been completed and the contingent desire has withdrawn. Hence the
equilibrium of qualified separateness is not restored. The victim’s lack of
independence thus remains a feature of the parties’ relationship.
This permanent nature of the alteration can be demonstrated in cases of
continuous victimization as well as in cases of random criminality. In cases
of continuous victimization, the victim’s will and the offender’s desire
remain concretely entangled during and following each act of victimization
(the desire never fully withdraws). Absent a restorative process, the actions
28. Or if the Rawlsian image of the moral subject is taken on board—crime makes the
victim less capable of acting based on suspension of, or abstraction from, (the Other’s)
desire, which is beyond her control, as required by the universal standpoint. The victim is
less capable of any meaningful exercise of self-legislation in the realm of agency and value.
Compare with Robert Bruce Ware, Hegel: The Logic of Self-Consciousness and the Legacy of
Subjective Freedom, ch. 6 (1999); and with Schwarzenbach, supra note 9, who provides one
example for a possible interpretation of Rawls in Hegelian light.
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of a battered woman in her relationship with her abuser may be ones of
submission accompanied by rage, and of fear; they are not actions of a sep-
arate soul who recognizes its independence.29 Furthermore, the implications
of the abuse might remain even after the abuse has stopped, for example,
because the abuser has lost his physical ability to abuse, or even because he
has decided to change his behavior. The sense of violation, which is an
expression of lost subjectivity, with its implications for the woman’s abil-
ities in the relationship, remains. In cases of a single random criminality, in
the face of which the victim shrugs her shoulders, a similar process takes
place, though its concrete expressions are different. Notwithstanding her
indifference, the victim whose car has been stolen will not want to have
anything to do with the thief, because their potential relationship is now
ruined. It is ruined because the thief has taken hold of her area of domin-
ion, and this fact has become a feature of any relationship they might have.
One of the victim’s boundaries has been eliminated, and the inequality of
boundaries with its significance for the equilibrium of qualified separate-
ness will find its destructive, entangling expression in any such developing
relationship. The alteration of motivations is thus permanent both when
crime is continuous and when it is random.
The intrusion alters the victim’s motivations even where there is no out-
front attack and the victim does not know that she has been wronged, like
in the case of criminal fraud.30 In such a case, the victim is not conscious of
the fact that her boundaries have been transgressed and that the offender’s
desire has gained control over one of her fundamental constituents (her
control over her property), but in fact this is how things are. Her dominion
over her property has become hollow in this relationship. The victim’s
qualified separateness is therefore a false one, and the relationship is not
one of two independent subjects.
29. See, e.g., LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (3rd ed.
2009) (especially ch. 4 on learned helplessness); Lenore E.A. Walker, Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder in Women: Diagnosis and Treatment of Battered Woman Syndrome, 28 PSYCHO-
THERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH, PRACTICE, TRAINING 21 (1991).
30. Criminal fraud (and other related offenses) has given rise to various debates,
including debates over the justification underlying its prohibition and the limits of the
prohibition. For a discussion, see Stuart Green, Lying, Stealing, and Cheating: A Moral
Theory of White Collar Crimes (2007).
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D. Restorative Punishment
For the misrecognition of crime to be replaced by rational and universal
recognition, the parties’ boundaries have to be re-equalized so that the
equilibrium of qualified separateness is restored.31 This section analyzes
punishment as a practice that replaces transgressive particularity with uni-
versal rationality; a practice that reestablishes equality of boundaries
between the offender and the victim, and reinstates the equilibrium of
qualified separateness.32
The normative significance of punishment is rooted not so much in its
universalistic form but in its universalizing substance or content. Punish-
ment restores the universal subject-subject relation between the offender
and the victim. Restoration is achieved thanks to two characteristics of
punishment:
First, it is transgressive of the offender’s fundamental boundaries. Pun-
ishment may forcibly cross the offender’s bodily boundaries in the broad
sense described above, namely the boundaries that mark the will’s exclusive
control over the body and over action. This is achieved through the impo-
sition of bodily restrains (imprisonment) or of bodily action (punishment
in the community). Alternatively, punishment may cross the offender’s
boundaries of property by way of imposing a fine.
Second, this punitive transgression stands in symmetrical relation to the
offender’s original transgression of the victim’s boundaries. Crime took
advantage of the vulnerability of the victim’s boundaries to eliminate one
of them; it therefore created inequality of boundaries, and the logical and
actual implication of this inequality is intrusion on the victim by the
offender’s desire and the denial of his subjectivity. Punishment symmetri-
cally eliminates one of the offender’s boundaries.
These two characteristics of punishment bring about mutual recogni-
tion. Following the imposition of punishment, the offender’s transgressive
31. Compare with Brudner’s interpretation of Hegel in BRUDNER, supra note 5, at 47.
32. Hegel’s analysis of crime in the Philosophy of Right (supra note 6) does not include
explicit reference to his analysis of transgressive human action in the Phenomenology (supra
note 7). Brudner refers to punishment as ‘‘denying the denial’’ of the authority of mutual
recognition as Law; but this too does not seem to provide a sufficient justification for the
imposition of crime, since it is doubtful whether punishment is the only way to deny this
denial, and Brudner’s own discussion implies that this may not be the case. See Liat Levanon,
Personhood, Equality, and a Possible Justification for Criminal Punishment, 27 CANADIAN J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 439, 469–71 (2014).
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will encounters the universal but (at that moment) equally transgressive
punitive will, which is deployed by the state on behalf of the victim.33 The
offender’s will then identifies its own transgressivity in that punitive will;
and it defends itself from this transgressivity by returning to itself, thereby
also mediating the return of the victim’s will to its own self. The victim
regains his independence and qualified separateness, and abstracts from the
offender’s particularistic will. Now, the offender’s universality is reflected
back to him from the victim, and he successfully identifies it. This entire
process is the restoration of the universal rational structure of mutual
recognition; it is the reinstatement of the equilibrium of qualified separate-
ness. Punishment thus ‘‘fixes’’ the universal equilibrium of qualified sepa-
rateness, restoring the victim’s subjectivity in his relationship with the
offender.
Since state punishment is exercised on the offender on behalf of the
victim, it carries significance for the relationship between the two, and only
for this relationship. It is the victim’s universalistic will that is imposed by
the state on the offender in the context of their relationship, rather than the
will of other members of society or indeed that of the state. Accordingly,
only the offender’s boundaries with respect to the victim are altered. The
offender’s boundaries with respect to other members of society have not
been altered through punishment, and equilibrium between the offender
and others is maintained.
A related implication of this bilateral understanding of crime and pun-
ishment concerns the frequency of punishment. If crime is not entirely
destructive of the victim’s overall subjectivity but rather only affects it in
the context of her relationship with the offender, the duty to punish the
offender can be foregone in appropriate cases. The local nature of crime
allows for some flexibility in the imposition of punishment. This possibility
of foregoing punishment in appropriate cases can explain and even justify
the low frequency of punishment in the modern state. It can further
support reference to alternative nonpunitive dispute resolution mechan-
isms in some cases—accepting that the intrusion will remain intact while
other aspects of the injury, such as the sense of emotional offense and the
loss of confidence in shared values, will be addressed. The proposed
account can therefore justify punishment, but it does not necessitate pun-
ishing in every case.
33. The next subsection discusses the imposition of punishment by the state.
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E. Between Hegel and Morris
The above discussion of crime and punishment started with Hegel. It
adopted the Hegelian framework for analyzing subjectivity in the following
respects: it acknowledged the significance of mutual recognition for the
constitution of subjectivity; and it took mutual recognition to be a process
that involves cooperation between self and Other.34 The account further
used the Hegelian framework to conceptualize crime as an instance of
misrecognition that violates subjectivity and punishment as re-cognition
that can undo crime and (re)constitute subjectivity.
The discussion has, however, departed from Hegel in the analysis of the
social and political context of mutual recognition; in the analysis of the
exact challenge crime poses for mutual recognition; and in the understand-
ing of the way punishment works to undo this challenge.
As for the social and political context of mutual recognition: unlike
Hegel, the proposed account suggests that in the context of crime and
punishment, the mutually (mis)recognizing subjects are the offender and
the victim, rather than each of them and the state.35 In collapsing crime
and punishment into bilateral justice, the proposed account is closer to
Victor Tadros’ account that suggests that by being punished, the offender’s
duty to the victim is fulfilled.36 This bilateral understanding of crime and
34. The proposed exposition of this cooperation will be partly informed by Axel
Honneth illuminating account of Hegelian mutual recognition. AXEL HONNETH, THE
STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (1995).
35. Such an assumption drifts away from Hegelian philosophy of the subject. It draws on
psychoanalytic theory, and especially on Donald Winnicott’s object relation theory (see
especially D.W. WINNICOTT: THE CHILD, THE FAMILY, AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD
(1964); Donald W. Winnicott, The Mother-Infant Experience of Mutuality, in PARENT-
HOOD: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 245 (E.J. Anthony & Therese Benedek
eds. 1970); DONALD W. WINNICOTT, MATURATIONAL PROCESSES AND THE FACILI-
TATING ENVIRONMENT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(M. Masud & R. Khan eds. 1965); Donald W. Winnicott, The Theory of Parent-Infant
Relationship, 41 INT’L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 585 (1960). For a brief account, see MICHAEL
JACOBS, D.W. WINNICOTT 34–37 (Key Figures in Councelling and Therapy, Windy
Dryden ser. ed., 1995). Yet the structure of mutual recognition offered by Hegel is very close
to the structure offered by Winnicott. See Honneth’s illuminating reference to object
relation theory in his naturalization of Hegel (supra note 34, at ch. 5). Full development of
a bilateral account of subjectivity goes beyond the scope of this article.
36. For Tadros, an attacker has a duty to rectify the relevant harm to the victim; the duty
is fulfilled by carrying the burden of general deterrence, thus preventing additional (and
certain) attacks on the victim; and additionally, the attacker has a duty toward the victim to
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punishment resonates with the increasing acknowledgement of victims’
rights and roles in the criminal justice system.
Accordingly, the proposed account also departs from Hegel in conceptu-
alizing the challenge for mutual recognition that is posed by crime. It does
not assume, like Hegel, that crime violates state-acknowledged Right.
Rather, it assumes that crime undermines the conditions of bilateral mutual
recognition. The proposed account further assumes, this time together with
Morris, that the relation between mutually recognizing subjects is a semicon-
tractual relation for which equality is central. It is also assumed, with Morris,
that crime violates this equality and punishment restores it. Yet the relevant
equality is not equality of liberty between all the citizens, as suggested by
Morris, but equality of personal boundaries between the offender and the
victim.37 Crime is an instance of misrecognition whereby the offender cre-
ates inequality of boundaries between himself and the victim, and thereby
intrudes the victim’s boundaries.
Building on this conceptualization of crime, the proposed account fur-
ther departs from the Hegelian analysis of the way in which criminal
punishment restores that which has been violated by crime. Rather than
restoring the validity of Right in the context of the just state, the proposed
account advances the argument that punishment reinstates equality of
boundaries between the offender and the victim, thereby restoring mutual
recognition and correcting the victim’s violated subjectivity. This concep-
tualization accords with the increasing acknowledgement of equality and
fairness as the foundations of justice without paying the price of an artificial
understanding of the nature of crime.
I I . OB JECT IONS TO THE PROPOSED ACCOUNT
A. State Punishment
The objection regarding state punishment casts doubt on the ability of the
proposed account to justify state punishment rather than (undesirable and
carry a burden that is as heavy as the burden the victim could permissibly have imposed on
the attacker in self-defense. See VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 277, 283, 291 (2011).
37. A relationship in which freedom—that does not include the self-defeating freedom
to transgress boundaries—exists.
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unjustifiable) private punishment. The proposed analysis has located the locus
of crime in the relationship between the offender and the victim;38 the state
has been posited in the background of this relationship. But when it comes to
criminal punishment, the state rather than anyone else is the active player.
This coming to the forefront of the state requires explanation and justification.
There are three reasons why punishment is to be imposed by the state.
First, to be able to reestablish the universality of mutual recognition, the
punishing will must be at the same time not only particularistic and trans-
gressive but also universalistic. As the offender’s will withdraws, the punish-
ing will must be able to recognize its own universality in the offender,
thereby mutually withdrawing and reestablishing equilibrium of qualified
separateness. In other words, the imposition of punishment must express
a universal standpoint, namely a standpoint that suspends particularities.39
Yet adopting the universal standpoint might be a difficult task, partic-
ularly in the context of a criminal conflict. It involves identifying and
suspending the particularistic, which often appears to be universal.40 Pri-
vate agents can never be sure they fully abstract from particularity, and so
their standpoint can never be sure to be the universal standpoint. Further-
more, when the private agent is a victim whose boundaries have been
transgressed by the offender and who is therefore incapable of universal
rationality in the relationship, the universal standpoint is beyond reach.
This becomes crucial in the context of punitive action, which is transgres-
sive of fundamental boundaries, and hence potentially detrimental to the
offender’s subjectivity. A victim’s response to crime is therefore always at
least suspected as merely private revenge—as an asymmetrical transgression
of the offender’s boundaries that does not correspond to his crime but rather
38. Victor Tadros makes a similar move (see supra note 36).
39. Compare with Kant’s comment on the amount of punishment: ‘‘it must be well
understood, however, that this determination [must be made] in the chambers of a court of
justice (and not in your private judgement). All other standards fluctuate back and forth
and, because extraneous considerations are mixed with them, they cannot be compatible
with the principle of pure and strict legal justice.’’ (IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138–39 (THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
PART I, John Ladd trans., intro., 2nd ed. 1999) (1797). But see Rawls’ different justification
for state punishment in John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
40. It may be hard to tell whether one’s wish to impose sanctions on a polygamous
minority, or not to impose sanctions on those who kill in duel, can hold following sus-
pension of one’s particularistic background and upbringing. Accordingly, the debate over
such questions is ever-present in civil society.
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amounts to another crime against him. Accordingly, victims cannot qualify
as punitive authorities. But suspension of particularities is more readily
available when done in a collective process where particularities expose
themselves as such. The just—or universalistic—state is a sophisticated form
of suspended particularity.41 Hence, the just state, and only the just state (or
similarly advanced social mechanisms, such as the international community),
can act coercively and yet universally in the imposition of punishment on
behalf of the victim.
The second and related reason why punishment is to be imposed by
the state has to do with the role of the state as a recognizer (one of many).
The state stands in a bilateral relation with each citizen, in which it
functions as a generalized recognizer.42 Arguably, when the state, which
is best situated to respond to transgressions, omits to respond to a trans-
gression, the transgression can be justifiably attributed not only to the
individual violator but also to the state; and the omission to respond
thereby becomes an instance of misrecognition by the state. The only
way to prevent or undo this misrecognition is by acting—by redressing
the original transgression by the offender through the imposition of state
punishment. State punishment is, thus, an act of recognition of the
victim by the state performed in the context of the victim-state
relationship.
Last, it can be mentioned that state punishment is also appropriate
because the offender-victim relationship and the state-victim relationship
cross one another. Although bilateral relationships are independent from
one another, they are still affected by one another. The victim can draw
emotional and mental energies from the state’s punitive act of recognition
performed in the victim-state relationship as described above. These
energies can be used in her relationship with the offender. They would
ease the task of maintaining the equilibrium that was reestablished by
punishment. Thus, recognition by the state supports recognition by the
offender.
41. There is no need to explain here how exactly the state allows for suspension of
particularity (deliberative accounts of democracy provide one possible answer).
42. This argument will not be developed here, but see George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and
Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Charles W. Morris ed., intro., 1962) at
286–87.
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B. The Amount of Punishment
An account of punishment that is based on the principle of equality can be
easily suspected of adopting lex talionis and leading to excessive punish-
ment. Arguably, the proposed account implies that punishment should
transgress the offender’s boundaries to the extent that the original crime
transgressed the victim’s boundaries, with the prospect of reestablishing
equality between the two.43 Let us see why this is not the case.
Restoration of the equilibrium of qualified separateness requires rees-
tablishment of equal boundaries, but this does not entail that the punitive
transgression be equal to the criminal transgression. Transgression includes
elimination of a boundary and intrusion by an Other’s will. These two
characteristics of the transgression are logically distinct. The locus of crime
is the elimination of a boundary. It is this elimination that brings about the
collapse of the equilibrium and allows the offender’s will to intrude—more
or less deeply, as the case may be. Accordingly the locus of punishment is
the symmetrical elimination of a boundary; it is not the equal depth of the
intrusion. Restoration of the equilibrium of qualified separateness only
requires reinstatement of equal boundaries, not the performance of equally
deep intrusions.
Thus the amount of punishment should be determined according to the
scope or extent of the transgressed boundary (to what extent does it ensure
dominion or exclusive control over oneself: how essential for subjectivity as
a whole it is,44 and how much of it has been eliminated). For example, the
victim of a punch in the shoulder loses dominion over some aspects of his
body but not over others, whereas the victim of a stab undergoes a more
comprehensive loss of dominion—usually over his body in its entirety.
Accordingly, the appropriate punitive response for a punch in the shoulder
may be punishment in the community with its partial loss of dominion
over (bodily) action; and the appropriate punishment for a stab would be
imprisonment with its more comprehensive loss of dominion. There is no
need for a deeper transgression of the offender’s bodily boundary, for
example, in the form of physical violence. Indeed, adding to the
43. For a more exhaustive discussion, see Levanon, supra note 32, 459–61.
44. For example, bodily boundaries are essential for subjectivity in the sense that
without them any form of subjectivity cannot exist; boundaries of property are essential in
the sense that without them full subjectivity is impossible (or so the argument may go), but
less than full subjectivity is possible.
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elimination of a boundary another element of deep transgression goes
outside the scope of punishment and is nothing but arbitrary violence.45
On the other hand, it could also be argued that at least in some cases, the
proposed account cannot justify the imposition of sufficient or indeed any
punishment. Significantly, it cannot justify the imposition of even minimal
punishment for homicide. In the case of homicide, the victim’s subjectivity
cannot be restored in its actual existence, and hence the justification for
punishment is, arguably, lost. The same might be true for all cases where
the victim has passed away, even unrelatedly to the offense: where there
is not a victim whose subjectivity can be restored, there is, arguably, no
justification for punishment.
But subjectivity does not gain its actuality only through the live victim.
In mutual recognition, subjectivity is part of a relationship and is actualized
through both parties of the relationship. Thus, even following the victim’s
death, the relationship between the victim and the offender still has exis-
tence and actuality through the offender. In the context of this relationship,
the offender’s will can be made to withdraw back to its own boundaries in
a way that recreates the conditions for the victim’s actual subjective exis-
tence. Recreation of these conditions restores the victim’s subjectivity in
the relationship without actualizing it through the living victim. As the
offender’s will withdraws, the dead victim gains the place of a dead subject
even in the context of this relationship, rather than the place of a mere
object that was disposed of.46 Thus, extensive transgression of the offen-
der’s boundaries is justified even in cases of homicide or in other cases
where the victim has passed away before punishment has been imposed.
45. Moreover, punishment works to reestablish equality of boundaries not only by
transgressing the offender’s boundaries but also by setting new boundaries for the victim—
boundaries that were not there in the precriminal stage. When punishment is imposed, the
(state on behalf of the) victim gains immunity from the offender’s self-defensive force (the
offender, who would otherwise have been permitted to defend himself from violence, is not
allowed to defend himself from punishment); and where punishment incapacitates, the
victim further gains immunity from trivial and otherwise permitted interferences by the
offender. Accordingly, punishment that is as transgressive as crime would be overly trans-
gressive; it would move the parties from disturbed equilibrium that violates the victim’s
subjectivity to another disturbed equilibrium that violates the offender’s subjectivity. It
would therefore amount to another crime.
46. Clearly, the task of restoring subjectivity or hypothetical subjectivity would not
permit the death penalty.
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C. Punishment or Compensation
Civil law usually governs the relationship between private agents. If crime
is meaningful in the relationship between the offender and the victim,
one may wonder why civil compensation would not have the required
restorative effects.
Civil law presumes a healthy subject-subject relation in which some of
the victim’s interests have been unfairly or unjustly set back. A subject who
has been injured by another suffers inconvenience and loss. The responsi-
ble injurer should then—as a matter of distributive justice—compensate
the injured party, thus adding convenience and eliminating loss, thereby
redressing the setback of interests. With the redressing of those interests,
that which has been violated is restored.
But where the responsible injurer further has the relevant mens rea,
the injury does more than setting back interests through the causation of
loss and inconvenience. The injury is then also an intrusion by his will
of the victim’s fundamental boundaries—an intrusion that violates the
victim’s subjectivity. Civil law cannot undo such violations of subjec-
tivity. Paying compensation would not cause the intruder’s will to with-
draw and set the victim free. It does not take from the offender that
which is his own, but only that which fairly belongs to the victim. Thus,
it does not transgress the offender’s fundamental boundaries, and cannot
reestablish equality of boundaries and correct the disrupted equilibrium
of qualified separateness. For this reason, the injured victim who was
merely compensated for her loss and inconvenience would still not be
able to maintain a healthy subject-subject relation with the offender. To
restore the victim’s subjectivity in the relationship, criminal punishment
is necessary.
It should be noted, though, that punitive compensation works the
way punishment works, and can therefore work in some cases to correct
that which crime destroyed.47 Much like criminal fines, punitive com-
pensation takes from the offender that which belongs to her, thus
transgressing her fundamental boundaries and reestablishing equality
and equilibrium. Accordingly, where sufficient punitive compensation
47. For this reason, the constitutionality of punitive damages has been put in question.
See, e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983); John Calvin Jefferies Jr., A Comment on the Con-
stitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986).
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is imposed, there is no room for additional criminal sanction. A different
and controversial question of distributive justice is, Who should enjoy
that which has been taken from the defendant?48 This question does not
require answer here.
D. Punishment for Offenses against the Public
Crime does not always target individuals. Often crime targets the state,
the pubic, or indeed animals or the environment. Arguably, since the
proposed account locates the justification for punishment in the relation-
ship between the offender and a specific victim, it cannot explain or
justify the criminalization of conduct that does not target specified
individuals.
Endowing legal protection to public institutions and assets can be jus-
tified under the assumptions of the proposed account, since they have a role
in the formulation of subjectivity through mutual recognition. Political
and social institutions, and even the natural world, can support and cata-
lyze recognition, and they further provide various settings and media for
recognition. Such institutions and assets can, for example, allow for the
development of essential relevant skills such as language; assist the devel-
opment of relevant cognitive and emotional abilities (such as appreciation
for that which is distinct, empathy, etc.); and protect essential contingent
aspects of subjectivity such as the body. Accordingly, it would be justified
to protect the state that, in turn, protects our bodies and further provides
settings for cognitive and emotional development; and it is arguably also
justified to protect our partial and unilateral separateness from animals.49
The more significant a social, political, or natural mechanism is for the
formulation of recognition, the more justified it is to endow that
48. The question further goes to the basic characterization of punitive damages as
punitive or compensatory (of general society or of certain classes in society). See Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN
OBLIGATIONS (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 2nd ed. 1989); KEITH TESTER, ANIMALS
AND SOCIETY: THE HUMANITY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS (1991); Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do
Animals Have Rights?, in ANIMAL WELFARE 29 (Council of Europe, 2006). This implies the
kinds of goods that can be legitimately protected by the criminal law. Evidently, these are
narrow in scope, and resemble more the kind of goods protected, for example, by the
German criminal law. This point will not be developed herein.
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mechanism with institutionalized protection through legal prohibition on
its infringement.50
The need for legal protection, however, does not yet justify the imposition
of punishment in case of violation, and the justification of punishment
should be sought elsewhere. In these cases, the justifiability of punishment
is rooted in the prohibition itself: the legitimate decision to prohibit certain
types of conduct changes the relationships between citizens in a way that
justifies sanctions for violation. This decision resets the equilibrium of
qualified separateness in the relationship between citizens, and in the newly
formulated equilibrium, violation of the prohibition carries the meanings
of crime.
The prohibition resets the equilibrium in two ways. First, it places new
limitations on everyone’s a priori permitted actions. Since a random and
singular violation of social institutions or assets has no effect on them,51 it is
a priori legitimate. Accordingly, its prohibition transgresses, as it were, every-
one’s boundaries. The prohibition is an interference of each agent with her
fellow agents’ boundaries; yet its universal application ensures equality and
equilibrium.52 Second and more importantly, the prohibition manifests (or
rather creates) a relation that bears similarities to property relations between
each subject and the protected institution or asset. These institutions and
assets then become (posteriori, after the imposition of the prohibition) an
aspect of subjects’ fundamental boundaries in their relationships with one
another:53 My country is mine in the sense that a fellow citizen who acts
against it also acts against me, much in the way that she would act against me
if he acted against my property. Accordingly, following the imposition of the
prohibition, the equilibrium of qualified separateness consists of more fun-
damental boundaries than it had prior to the prohibition.
Since the prohibition resets the equilibrium of qualified separateness, its
violation does disturb this equilibrium. The offender breaks out of her
50. That is, by having in place a ‘‘property rule’’ of a kind that would ensure that violations
would be negligible. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View from the Cathedral, 85 HARVARD L. REV. 1089 (1972).
51. This aspect of offenses against the public has been analyzed in different ways. See Joel
Feinberg’s analysis in Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (1990) at 33–37.
52. Compare with Morris’ account, supra note 10.
53. These elements are a priori inessential for the constitution of subjectivity, yet due to
their relation to subjectivity, society transforms them into constituents through the imposition
of a prohibition that puts them within the fundamental bounds of bilateral subjectivity.
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(new) boundaries, and since her boundaries mark not only the edge of her
personal realm but also the beginning of the realm of others, this breaking
out is also the transgression of others. And this transgressive disturbance of
the equilibrium is crime.54
I I I . IMPL ICAT IONS FOR CR IM INAL LAW DOCTR INE
A. Mens Rea
‘‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.’’
—Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.55
The law of mens rea can be straightforwardly justified by retributivist
theories of crime and punishment that conceive crime as a violation of
universal duty in the formal sense and focus on the offender’s choice to
violate this duty. Mens rea is an essential component of that choice, and its
different variants (such as recklessness and intent) reflect the strength of the
choice and the extent to which it challenges duty.56 Such theories, how-
ever, do not account for the significance of mens rea for victims. They do
not explain why being kicked is more destructive for the victim than being
stumbled over.
The proposed account can explain the significance of mens rea for the
victim. The basic premises of the proposed account are that crime is
a transgression of boundaries, and that boundaries are the subject’s con-
tingent characteristics and under the exclusive control of the subject’s will.
‘‘Exclusive control’’ is not absolute control: the contingent aspect of the
subject’s boundaries can always be affected, such as by natural events, and
the boundaries would still remain within the subject’s exclusive control.
‘‘Exclusive control’’ is only exclusive of other wills. Accordingly, an act by
another will, and only such act, can transgress boundaries and violate the
victim’s subjectivity, that is, constitute crime. But acts of will are possible
only where there is knowledge of relevant facts or of the possibility thereof,
or mens rea in the form or intent or subjective recklessness. Absent mens
54. See Levanon, supra note 32, 462–64.
55. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW (Lecture I: Early Forms of
Liability) (The Project Gutenberg Ebook: 2000) (1909).
56. The ‘‘choice theory’’ has different variants, leading to different conclusions. For
a brief critical account, see BRUDNER, supra note 5, at 70–75.
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rea, the acts are not acts of will. The offender’s will does not claim control
over the ‘‘victim’s’’ boundaries, neither does it gain such control. Thus, the
‘‘victim’s’’ exclusive control over boundaries is not challenged, there is no
inequality of boundaries between the two, and no consequent transgression
that undermines the victim’s subjectivity and requires redress through
punishment. Absent mens rea there is, therefore, no crime.
When it comes to standards of reasonableness as exemplified in the law
of objective recklessness and negligence, the proposed account can explain
the transition from a purely objective standard to a standard that takes
count of at least some of the defendant’s characteristics (such as sex and
age).57 Taking count of these characteristics reflects an attempt to under-
stand the defendant’s attitude toward the victim: Was the defendant capa-
ble of a mental effort that would have alerted him to the risk, but failed to
make this effort because of indifference toward the victim’s subjectivity?
Such indifference is condemnable because what underlies it is a wish to
expand the scope of one’s will beyond one’s boundaries even at the expense
of others. This wish poses a challenge to the victim’s boundaries, even if
only implicitly. The transition to standards of reasonableness that take into
account some of the offender’s characteristics thus reflects an attempt to
capture only those offenders who pose challenges to victims’ boundaries.
On the other hand, in the context of the proposed account purely
objective standards of reasonableness cannot be the basis for criminal
sanctions. The actions of the objectively negligent do not manifest any
explicit or implicit claim for control over the victim’s boundaries, neither
do they reflect a desire to control the victim’s boundaries. Accordingly,
intrusion of the actor in the form of punishment would not undo that
which has been done. Rather, it would amount to an unnecessary violation
of the actor’s subjectivity. To be sure, objectively reckless or negligent
actions do hinder interests. Furthermore, they affect contingent aspects
of subjectivity (such as the body, which is an aspect of action) and might
57. In the United States, see Model Penal Code § 2.202(2)(c)–(d) (defining recklessness
and negligence with reference to the actor’s situation), and, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.
2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (in the context of battered women’s syndrome); in Canada, see, e.g., R v.
Ruzic [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, para. 61 (in the context of the common law defense of duress); in
the United Kingdom, see § 54(1)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (in the context of the
partial defense of loss of control). For a thorough analysis, see MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING
THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE
STANDARD (2003).
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therefore have contingent implications for the victim’s subjectivity in his
future relationships with others, including the actor. They should therefore
be discouraged and give rise to compensatory duties. But once such actions
are taken, punishment will have no restorative implications. Punishment
on the basis of purely objective reasonableness tests should therefore be
avoided.
B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The proposed account further offers insight with respect to the distinction
between basic crime and aggravated or mitigated crime, especially to the
extent that this distinction is applicable to ‘‘one-off’’ random criminality as
opposed to repetitive and continuous criminality. It is often the case that
repetitive criminality is taken as inequivalent to random one-off criminal-
ity.58 The gradation is, however, not uniform: in some jurisdictions repet-
itive criminality is conceived as an aggravating factor, and others the lack of
previous criminal activity is conceived as a mitigating factor.59 Retributivist
theories can account for the gradation based on the greater antisocial
attitude, and hence greater blameworthiness, demonstrated by repetitive
criminality. Such theories do not, however, provide the theoretical basis for
determining which of the cases should be conceived as the basic form of
crime. Furthermore, retributivist theories do not explain the differences
and the similarities between repetitive crime directed at the same victim
and repetitive crime directed at different victims. The significance of rep-
etition for the victim is therefore lost. The proposed account provides
a theoretical basis for considering repetitive criminality directed at the same
victim, or similarly destructive criminal acts, as the basic or typical forms of
crime.
The proposed analysis of crime took violence against women as its
typical case. It was demonstrated that the most striking characteristic of
such violence—the elimination of the victim’s subjectivity in her relation-
ship with the offender—can be identified also in cases of random one-off
criminality, even if in a different form and to a lower extent. Theoretical
grounds were laid down for describing crime with reference to that
58. See, e.g., § 210.6(4)(a) of the Model Penal Code, which sets lack of previous criminal
activity as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing for murder; 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(2)–(4),
which set previous convictions as aggravating factors for homicide.
59. Id.
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characteristic (violation of the victim’s subjectivity in the relationship).
Thus, the typical case of crime, which is also taken as the basic form of
crime, is characterized with reference to its context: it is either continuous
and has accumulating implications for the victim, or it has some other
characteristics that, given social or other realities, bring about a serious
violation or even elimination of subjectivity.
Although violence against women is the typical case that highlights the
characteristics of basic criminality, there may be other forms of basic crim-
inality. One of these is the case of multiple victims—either of the particular
commission (such as terrorism) or of a series of previous commissions (such
as professional criminality). Multiplicity of victims demonstrates the of-
fender’s special difficulty in identifying himself in others. This difficulty
makes it harder for the victim to shrug her shoulders and continue with her
life. Accordingly, the manner in which the violation of her subjectivity will
be expressed is likely to be closer to that exemplified by victims of abuse
(including submission and lack of clear sense of self in the context of the
relationship with the offender). Given its similarity to the typical case, this
case too should be treated as basic.
On the other hand, where crime is a one-off, random act and has no
context that makes it entirely destructive of subjectivity, liability should be
mitigated. In such a case, the victim will be able to regain her independence
within the relationship more easily, with the help of some mild form of
state punishment. This approach accords more with the Model Penal
Code, which takes the lack of previous criminal activity as a mitigating
circumstance, than with the Federal Code, which takes previous convic-
tions as an aggravating circumstance.60
C. Omissions
‘‘Commission by omission’’ is consensual yet not an unproblematic doc-
trine.61 It is not easy to account for the imposition of criminal liability for
‘‘harmful omissions.’’ The main difficulty is that if the empiricist concept of
causation is taken on board, omissions do not cause any consequences,
60. Supra note 58.
61. For an a critical account of liability for omissions in American law, see Paul H.
Robinson, Criminal Liability for Omissions: A Brief Summary and Critique of the Law in the
United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 102 (1984).
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notwithstanding criminal consequences.62 Accordingly, it is hard to
explain why a person who does nothing should be criminally liable for
consequences he does not cause.63
Retributivist theories with deontological underpinnings might try
overcoming this difficulty by focusing on the offender’s duty to act in the
face of possible harmful consequences (agent-relative obligation).64 Yet the
source of such duties must still be accounted for. More often than not,
the literature addresses this issue as one of responsibility.65 It argues that
the actor who fails to act can rightly be seen as responsible for consequences
that could have been prevented by his action. But a doctrine of responsi-
bility is not yet a doctrine of criminal liability;66 the fact that an actor is
responsible for a consequence does not yet justify imposing liability for this
consequence.67 Thus, criminalizing and punishing for ‘‘harmful omis-
sions’’ would often remain difficult.
62. See generally Jonathan Bennet, Whatever the Consequences, 26 ANALYSIS 83 (1966);
P.J. Fitzgerald, Acting and Refraining, 27–28 ANALYSIS 133 (1966); Douglas N. Husak,
Omissions, Causation, and Liability, 30 PHIL Q. (1980). See also Arthur Leavens’ defense of
the causal status of omissions in A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 547 (1988).
63. For an extensive discussion, see MICHALE S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPON-
SIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 51 (2009). See also J. C. Smith,
Liability for Omissions in the Criminal Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984).
64. Compare with George Fletcher’s analysis in his RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 8.2
(2000).
65. There have been many suggestions in the literature. See, e.g., Jacobo Dopico Gómez-
Aller, Criminal Omissions: A European Perspective, 11 N. CRIM. L. REV. 419 (2008). See also
Jesús-Marı́a Silva Sánchez, Criminal Omissions: Some Relevant Distinctions, 11 N. CRIM. L.
REV. 452 (2008); and VICTOR TADROS, Criminal Omissions: Culpability, Responsibility, and
Liberty, in CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 182 (Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and
Justice, 2007).
66. An exception can be found in Geoffrey Mead, Contracting into Crime: A Theory of
Criminal Omissions, 11(2) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 147–73 (1991). Mead is aware of the need
to conceptualize crime before accounting for criminal omissions, yet he does so only briefly.
67. Where principles of responsibility are relied on to justify liability, the outcome might
well be internal tension between the assumptions underlying the two. See, for example,
Gómez-Aller’s presumptions regarding the possibility of acting through tools and other
objects. Such presumptions bear similarity to existentialist conceptualizations of the self (see
Meir Dan Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARVARD L. REV. 959, esp.
967–68 (1992)). They cannot be straightforwardly reconciled with classical retributivism,
whose theoretical underpinnings are Kantian (including the very different Kantian account of
the I or the self).
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The proposed account can ease the tension between the empiricist
conception of causation, conceptions of responsibility, and conceptions
of criminal liability, crime, and punishment. It suggests that the will can
expand through contingencies other than the body and bodily action—for
example, through property or other objects over which it takes control via
mediating social mechanisms (for example, dangerous machines that are
under an employee’s control based on the contract between the employee
and the employer/owner).68 When a will gains control over an object, any
danger posed by this object is a danger posed by this will; the movement of
the object is the movement of the will, and hence the will is active in
creating the risk.69 The fact that the body, which is also under the will’s
control, is passive is contingent and morally insignificant. Similarly, on
other occasions the will takes control over specific risks to specific others
(the doctor who takes control over risks to patients’ health; the parent who
takes control over risks to children). Here, too, taking control over risks—
turning them into ‘‘the will’s business,’’ or to contingencies through which
the will expresses itself—turns the will into a cause capable of bringing
about intrusion (or criminal harm). Thus in all these cases, the essentially
dynamic will can be seen as actively causing harm where it does not
counter-act through bodily action. If the will is active, the body’s passivity
should not stand in the way of imposing criminal liability. Where the will is
active, the actor is responsible for the consequences it causes; and where its
activity is intrusive and destructive of the victim’s subjectivity, the actor is
also liable for crime.
The more difficult question concerns instances in which the will does
not take control over the danger in any way. An example would be where
by mere chance a person can use his car to block the way of a rolling rock
that would otherwise injure another. Legal systems and legal theorists hold
different views on this question.70 The proposed account suggests that
criminal law should not impose a duty to rescue in such circumstances.
68. Compare with MEIR DAN COHEN, Part Three: Boundaries of Self, in HARMFUL
THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY (2002).
69. Compare Gómez-Aller, supra note 65.
70. See, e.g., Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Survey, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631
(1952); Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan: Should There be a Duty to
Rescue?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999); Hanoch Dagan, In Defense of the Good
Samaritan, MICH. L. REV. 1152–1200 (1999); John Kleinig, Good Samaritanism, PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 382–407 (1976).
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The will is not in any way active in bringing about the harmful conse-
quences, and can therefore not be seen as causing these consequences for
purposes of criminal law. This would be the case even if the actor who
perceives the danger wants the harmful consequence to occur, but does not
take control of it in any way. This conclusion accords with, and provides
foundations to, the legal reality in common law jurisdictions.71
D. Attempt
The relation between the amount of punishment for full commission of
offenses and the amount of punishment for attempt is neither uniform
across different jurisdictions nor consensual amongst legal theorists.72
Retributivist theories with subjectivist underpinnings might be able to
justify a law of attempt, such as the English one, according to which the
maximal punishment for attempt is as high as the maximal punishment for
successful commission.73 The justification of such a legal position would
rely on the moral significance of the defendant’s choice to commit crime,
on the determination and antisocial attitude manifested in her actions, and
possibly also on her dangerousness.74 But retributivist theories with subjec-
tivist underpinnings, or at least the classical Kantian variations of those,75
encounter a more difficult challenge in the face of a law, such as the Cana-
dian one, which sets lower punishments for attempt than for successful
commission.76 Similar challenges are posed by more nuanced approaches
71. For another attempt to explain the lack of a duty to rescue, see Philip W. Romohr,
A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical Foundations of the No-Duty-To-Rescue
Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025 (2006). It should be noted, though, that this legal reality has been
heavily criticized. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J.
247 (1980); Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Indi-
vidualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252 (1983–84).
72. See Antony Duff’s overview and discussion in CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS (1996) Part I,
ch. 4, p. 116.
73. The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (UK), § 4.
74. For an account of subjectivist theories of attempt, and an attempt to develop an
objectivist deontological theory, see Antony Duff, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS (1996).
75. For an attempt to justify milder punishment, based on a fair-play account of crime
and punishment, see Davis, supra note 13. But see R.A. Duff, Auctions, Lotteries, and the
Punishment of Attempts, 9 LAW & PHIL. 1–37 (1990); David Dolinko, Mismeasuring ‘‘Unfair
Advantage:’’ A Response to Michael Davis, 14(4) LAW & PHIL. 493–524 (1994).
76. Canadian Criminal Code § 43. The punishability of attempt has received much
attention in the literature. See, e.g., Duff, supra note 75; Björn Burkhardt, Is There a Rational
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such as those exemplified in the United States Code and in the Model Penal
Code, which set the same maximal punishment for attempt and full com-
mission for all but the gravest offenses.77 The variety of legal positions and
the difficulty in accounting for them seem to reflect conflicting but equally
valid intuitions regarding the punishability of attempt.
The proposed account reveals the theoretical proximity of attempt to
full commission, and it can therefore explain the willingness to punish
attempt as gravely as full commission. An attempt to commit crime already
includes within itself a challenge to the victim’s boundaries. The statement
that the attempter makes: ‘‘your boundaries are mine to control’’—a state-
ment backed by action that could potentially have developed into a full
intrusion—already changes the balance between the two. Following this
initial act with its provocative meaning, the attempter already gains hold of
the victim’s boundaries—the victim’s boundary has not yet been removed,
and the offender’s will has not intruded the victim, but their wills are
struggling for exclusive control over this boundary. When an offender
points a gun at a victim, he coerces her to engage in a struggle over her
boundaries if she is to maintain her subjectivity; and this coercion already
demonstrates the lack of exclusivity of her control over her boundaries and
his partial control over them. Furthermore, given the noncontingent nature
of the will, once crime has been attempted, both parties continue exercising
control over the victim’s boundaries in a way that no longer puts the victim
at risk but still requires her engagement. The survivor of a failed rape does
not lose her subjectivity entirely in her relationship with the attempting
rapist who has not been punished; she can still face him and act as an agent
Justification for Punishing an Accomplished Crime More Severely than an Attempted Crime?,
1986 BYU L. REV. 553 (1986); Mordechai Kremnitzer, Is There a Rational Justification for
Punishing an Accomplished Crime More Severely than an Attempted Crime: A Comment on
Prof. Dr. Bjorn Burkhardt’s Paper, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 81 (1990). The question is related to the
more general question of moral luck and its implications for criminal law. See Nir Eisikovits,
Moral Luck and the Criminal Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 105 (Joseph Keim
Campbell et. al. eds., 2005).
77. Model Penal Code § 5.05(1): ‘‘Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt,
solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious
offense which is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy. An attempt,
solicitation or conspiracy to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony
of the second degree.’’ See also, e.g., 18 U.S. Code § 1349 (attempt to commit fraud offenses)
and 21 U.S. Code § 846 (attempt to commit drug offenses), and compare with 18 U.S. Code
§ 1113 (attempt to commit murder or manslaughter).
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in their relationship. But this requires more effort than is required in her
relationship with any other person, and she is at constant risk of regressing
into loss of subjectivity following even the smallest challenge the attempt-
ing rapist may pose. The relationship is thus affected; it is an unequal
relationship, even if the inequality is not as extreme and as destructive as
it would have been had the victim been raped. Accordingly, attempt is
theoretically close to full commission, and significant punishment is
required to alleviate the inequality.
Yet the proposed account can further provide normative foundations
for the intuitive moral (and in some jurisdictions also legal) distinction
between attempt and full commission. Alleviating the inequality of attempt
does not require punishment as grave as required for alleviating the
inequality of full and successful crime. The victim who has not been
intruded and has not lost subjectivity is still an active player in the rela-
tionship, capable of adopting the universal standpoint and resisting the
offender’s will with some assistance from, and mediation by, the state.
Given that the victim’s force is still partly viable, limited intrusion of the
offender’s boundaries will suffice to make the offender identify this force
and his own vulnerability, and withdraw back to himself in a mutual
exercise of recognition. An equal subject-subject relationship between the
failed rapist who spent only a limited time in prison and his victim is thus
conceivable. Accordingly, the maximal punishment for attempt should not
be as high as the maximal punishment for full commission.
E. Self-Defense
It may be wondered whether the proposed account does not put into
question the basic legal doctrine of self-defense. After all, self-defense is
often justified with reference to the threat the attacker imposes on the
socio-legal order.78 This threat explains why the legal system accepts and
indeed encourages the use of defensive force even where the costs of such
use are high. But if crime only works in the relationship between the
parties, it becomes harder to justify a defensive response that causes the
offender more harm than the original attack would have caused the victim.
78. For a comprehensive review, see BOAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL
LAW (2006).
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It may therefore seem that the proposed account can only justify a thin
right to self-defense that is based on a narrow balance of personal harms.
Recently, legal theorists have been developing accounts of self-defense that
dispose of reference to the socio-legal order. Victor Tadros refers to the attack-
er’s duty to prevent the harm she has unleashed to justify the use of defensive
force against her.79 But this line of argument gives rise to several difficulties,
the most serious of which is Tadros’ conclusion that the use of deadly self-
defensive force against a completely innocent agent is justified (rather than
merely excused).80 Tadros’ conceptualization thus leads to an overly broad
right to self-defense. John Gardner and François Tanguay-Renaud provide
partial theoretical foundation to self-defense with reference to the asym-
metrical moral standing of the attacked and the attacker and to derivative
considerations of desert.81 Yet Gardner and Tanguay-Renaud acknowledge
such considerations do not provide full justification for the use of self-
defensive force.82 A full and satisfactory conceptualization of self-defense
that disposes of reference to the socio-legal order is thus still hard to find.
In the proposed account, self-defense is justified based on the inequality
between the parties—inequality that develops in a nonlinear fashion
throughout the commission of the offense, and that therefore justifies
different responses at different stages. The development of inequality starts
as early as the stage of threat-creation or attempt. This initial inequality
may actually be particularly radical.83 At the stage of attempt or threat-
creation, the offender reaches toward a yet-unknown extent of the victim’s
boundaries; the offender claims control over some of the victim’s
79. TADROS, supra note 36.
80. Id. at 246–56. For critique of Tadros’ argument, see Liat Levanon, Punishment, Duty,
and Self Defense: A Comment on Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm,’’ 5 JERUSALEM REV.
LEGAL STUD. 75 (2012). See also Larry Alexander’s Critique in Can Self-Defence Justify
Punishment?, 32 LAW & PHIL. 159, esp. 168–71 (2013).
81. John Gardner & François Tanguay-Renaud, Desert and Avoidability in Self-Defense,
122(1) ETHICS, 111–134, Symposium on Jeff McMahan’s Killing in War (October 2011).
82. They suggest that a full account of self-defense would also need to be supported by
considerations of comparative justice similar to those proposed by Jeff McMahan in Killing
in War (2009). I do not address McMahan’s account of self-defense here, but it too provides
an example of disposing of reference to the socio-legal order. Yet, as already implied,
Gardner and Tanguay-Renaud have argued, above, that McMahan’s account mistakenly
fails to acknowledge the relevance of factors such as the attacker’s desert.
83. One should distinguish here between the stage of attempt or threat-creation and the
stage of punishment, in which the inequality has already moderated.
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boundaries and further claims power to determine how extensive this
control would be. At this unstable point, all of the victim’s boundaries are
not in her exclusive control: the robber might take her money or he might
also injure her; the rapist might rape or he might rape and kill her; and the
reckless driver might miss the victim or injure her or cause her death.84 The
developing inequality is therefore more radical than it is after the comple-
tion of crime, where the uncertainty is removed. Accordingly, a radical
response by the victim—a response that is more intrusive than the punitive
response to the full commission, and possibly also more intrusive than the
intrusion the offender would have committed otherwise—is justified. The
use of defensive force is thus justified by the need to free the victim’s
boundaries in their entirety.
Defensive force can be similarly used to protect a third person from
crime.85 Here, defensive force is exercised on behalf of that third person by
someone who is better situated for that exercise. As we saw, the state is
usually best situated to deal with threats to individuals’ subjectivity. This is
definitely the case following the materialization of the threat (the commis-
sion of crime), when punishment is due; but it is often the case also prior to
crime and during crime, where the police are best situated to intervene on
behalf of the victim. However, in some instances someone other than the
police is better situated for dealing with the threat. This might be another
citizen using defensive force to protect the victim. Still, the citizen who
defends a third person does so on behalf of that third person, and his will
should be conceived as the third person’s will.
Yet a radical defensive response would be harder to justify where the
threat is created by an innocent agent (the child, the insane, or the person
blown by a tornado86). Here, the victim maintains exclusive control over
her boundaries even in face of the threat, as there is no meaningful claim of
control over her boundaries by another subject: where the innocent agent is
a person blown by a tornado, there is no claim of control over boundaries
whatsoever; and where the innocent agent is a child, the claim is empty
since the child has not yet gained the full separateness and equilibrium
84. See a discussion of the cost of this uncertainty for the victim in Levanon, supra note
80, at 83–84.
85. See Model Penal Code § 3.05 (Use of Force for the Protection of Other Persons); in
Canada, Canadian Criminal Code § 34(1)(a); in the United Kingdom, Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008 § 76(10).
86. TADROS, supra note 36, at 248.
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required for such a claim to be a challenge. In the absence of a real challenge
for her boundaries, the victim may be excused if she reacts in a way that
causes more harm that she would have had to suffer had she not responded,
but in most cases she will not be justified in so doing.87
F. Necessity
The proposed account can also explain why courts in many common law
jurisdictions have been reluctant to acknowledge justificatory necessity;88
and it can further account for the critique of the law that suggests that there
might be reasons to acknowledge such a defense89 and for the growing
willingness in American law to acknowledge it.90
The doctrinal reluctance to acknowledge justificatory necessity can be
explained with reference to the nature of the risk in conditions of necessity.
In conditions of necessity, the risk of harm is created by circumstances
rather than by another subject. It is therefore similar to the risk created by
an innocent agent. Such a risk is not a risk to one’s boundaries in his
relationship with another subject. It does not pose a threat to any
subject-subject relation, or to anyone’s subjectivity. It is merely a risk of
setback of interests of full subjects. Intrusion of another subject’s bound-
aries and violation of his subjectivity in order to prevent a mere setback of
interests is hard to justify.
But arguably, violating subjectivity to prevent such a setback of interests
can be justified in some conditions. Natural circumstances are harmful
nonintrusions that set back contingent aspects of subjectivity, such as
bodily integrity. Where the risk is particularly extensive, these harmful
87. But see the discussion of justificatory necessity below.
88. Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 [Canada]. In the United Kingdom, the
defense of necessity is rarely granted. One restricted exception has been recognized in Re A
(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) (2000) 4 AER 96.
89. See, e.g., in Ireland, The Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper: Duress and
Necessity (LRC CP 39-2006). See also Michael Bohlander, Of Shipwrecked Sailors, Unborn
Children, Conjoined Twins and Hijacked Airplanes—Taking Human Life and the Defence of
Necessity, 70 J. CRIM. L. 147 (2006).
90. See Model Penal Code § 3.02, and see also, e.g., The New York Penal Law § 35.05(2).
Yet the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow a defense of necessity (United States v.
Bailey, 444 US 394 (1980); United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 US 483
(2001)). For a well-nuanced review, see Stephen S. Schwartz, Is There a Common Law
Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259 (2008).
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nonintrusions may have implications for the formulation of subjectivity in
the context of various bilateral relationships. Bodily harm that creates
extreme dependency on others, as well as certain types of brain damage,
can make it more difficult to be a full participant in processes of mutual
recognition. Although punishment is out of the question absent an actor
who possesses mens rea (as it cannot undo these implications), preventing
these implications by allowing a defense to the preventer may indeed be
justified. Accordingly, extensive threats to fundamental contingent aspects
of subjectivity can give rise to a defense of justificatory necessity, as seen in
American law.
Furthermore, the actor who acts under conditions of necessity does not
even seem to violate the subjectivity of another. This actor does not make
a claim that the boundaries of the subject he harms are his to control.
Rather, by taking responsibility for the situation he takes over the risk, and
then he acts to minimize its potential transgressivity by way of redistribu-
tion. The actor is, therefore, not an intruder; he works to minimize the
expansion of that which he has taken over rather than to maximize it. If the
actor does not intrude anyone’s boundaries, he does not commit crime.
Allowing a defense of justificatory necessity can be understood as reflecting
this noncriminal nature of the actor’s conduct.
G. Criminalization
Last, the proposed account has implications for criminalization. We can
take the hard case of sexual exploitation as an example. Sexual exploitation
of young persons and of disabled adults is often explicitly prohibited
by law,91 and its prohibition is hardly controversial. Yet some countries
further prohibit sexual exploitation of a capable adult who is placed in
a weak position vis-à-vis the exploiter.92 Such prohibitions are more
91. See 18 U.S. Code § 2251 (Sexual Exploitation of Children), and more generally 18 U.S.
Code ch. 110 (Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children). For a specific prohibition
on sexual exploitation of the mentally disabled, see, e.g., in Alaska, AS 11.41.420 Sexual
Assault in the Second Degree. In Canada, Criminal Code § 153 sets an offense of sexual
exploitation by a person ‘‘who is in a position of trust or authority towards a young person,
who is a person with whom the young person is in a relationship of dependency or who is in
a relationship with a young person that is exploitative of the young person.’’ Section 153.1
addresses sexual exploitation of disabled persons.
92. Wisconsin was the first American state to criminally prohibit, in 1983, sexual relations
between psychotherapists and patients (Wisconsin Criminal Code § 940.22). Other states
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difficult to justify. They are particularly difficult to justify where they apply
to a capable adult victim who submits to sexual intercourse in the hope of
some gain that the offender is uniquely situated to provide. Should sexual
activity be criminalized when the victim chose to pursue it in order to
advance another interest (such as progress at work) or to satisfy a childlike
psychological need (such as the need for love from an authoritative figure)?
And if so, why?
There may be different ways to account for criminalization in such cases.
It is possible to resort to the notion of consent, arguing that the victim did
not freely consent to the intercourse.93 One practical difficulty with such
a solution is that like any consent-centered solution, it puts the legal
spotlight on the victim rather than on the offender; this, in turn, can be
exploited by the participants in trials for sexual offenses. Another way to
account for criminalization of such sexual exploitation focuses on the
coercive violation of autonomy it involves—a violation that can be brought
about in different ways, some of which are not articulated in existing
definitions of consent.94 This solution requires thorough investigation into
sexual autonomy.
The proposed account takes a different route, focusing on the victim’s
preexisting cognitive or emotional vulnerability and showing how exploi-
tation of this vulnerability amounts to crime. In the proposed account,
crime is characterized as an asymmetrical dissolution of fundamental
boundaries resulting in the merging of the victim’s will into that of the
offender. The asymmetrical dissolution of boundaries destroys the victim’s
ability to act independently from the offender, and this destruction is the
essence of crime. Usually such a destructive asymmetrical dissolution takes
place through coercive transgression of one of the victim’s fundamental
boundaries, as we have seen. But in some cases coercive transgression is not
required. When the victim is, for example, a child or an adult with childlike
psychological needs who is placed in a weak position where these needs
have since enacted similar prohibitions. In Israel, § 346(b) of the criminal code prohibits
sexual intercourse where consent is achieved by way of exploiting a relation of authority at
work; and § 347A prohibits sexual intercourse between a therapist and a patient or past
patient, where consent is achieved by way of exploiting emotional dependency.
93. See. e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMI-
DATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998), especially in chapters 9–11.
94. Compare Victor Tadros, Rape Without Consent, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 515, esp.
538 (2006). See also SCHULHOFER, id., esp. chs. 8–11.
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might express themselves, the offender would not face an attempt to keep
his desire out. The victim would voluntarily remove one of her boundaries,
and he can ‘‘enter the front door.’’ And once the victim has given way for an
asymmetrical intrusion by the offender’s desire, she would not be able to
push this desire out by reestablishing the boundary she had voluntarily
removed. The same preexisting vulnerability that made her remove the
boundary would make her incapable of reestablishing it. The preexisting
vulnerability thus makes coercive force redundant, but the basic charac-
teristic of crime—the asymmetrical dissolution of boundaries—remains
intact.
Sexual exploitation falls within this last characterization of crime: First,
it involves dissolution of the victim’s sexual (bodily) boundaries. Second,
this dissolution is noncoercive and does not involve forced removal of
a boundary—the victim’s preexisting vulnerability brings about a voluntary
dissolution. Third, the outcome is a merge of wills—the victim no longer
distinguishes her reasons and motivations from those of the offender.95
Fourth, the merge is asymmetrical—only the victim, and not the offender,
cannot distinguish her motivations and reasons from those of the Other
(unlike in symmetrical relations where a momentary merge is the outcome
of love or deep solidarity). The offender’s will thus hooks the victim and
puts her within the offender’s power.96 And fifth, the victim’s ability to
separate herself from the offender is thereby destroyed: given her preexist-
ing vulnerability, she cannot bring this condition to an end by deciding to
actualize her potentially equal boundaries (which have not been removed
by the offender) and bring about mutual recognition.97 In these condi-
tions, reestablishment of symmetrical equilibrium requires punishment.
95. In this, amongst other characteristics, sexual exploitation is distinguishable from
other forms of exploitation, such as the shovel case introduced by Wertheimer in ALAN
WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996) at 22.
96. See the illuminating analysis in John R.S. Wilson, In One Another’s Power, 88 ETHICS
299 (1978).
97. In this, criminal sexual exploitation is different from other forms of sexual exploi-
tation—for example, by way of a false love statement. See Wilson, id.
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CONCLUS IONS
This article suggested that subjects exist in equilibrium of connectedness
and separateness. Following Hegel, it argued that only persons who recog-
nize their separateness from one another can exist as subjects who are
connected through an essential universal structure. It further argued that
the condition for the existence of the equilibrium of connectedness and
separateness is equality of personal boundaries.
The article then analyzed crime. Rather than taking random and isolated
criminality as its paradigmatic case, it took the common case of continuous
victimization as its paradigm. This allowed putting the spotlight on some
characteristics of all crimes that are often ignored. It has been demonstrated
that crime removes one of the victim’s personal boundaries, thus creating
inequality of boundaries between the victim and the offender—inequality
whose meaning is the collapse of the equilibrium of connectedness and
separateness between the two. Crime thus violates the victim’s subjectivity
in the context of her relationship with the offender.
Next, criminal punishment was accounted for. If crime is understood in
the abovementioned way, punishment can be accounted for as a practice
that reinstates equal boundaries, reestablishes the equilibrium of connect-
edness and separateness, and restores the victim’s subjectivity in her rela-
tionship with the offender.
Last, the implications of the proposed analysis for criminal law doctrine
were explored. It was demonstrated that the proposed analysis can explain
well-established doctrines such as commission by omission, general aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, and justificatory defenses; that it can
account for current trends in criminal law such as subjectivism and the
expansion of sexual offenses; and that it has various normative implications
for the development of these doctrines and offenses.
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